Summary

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The "Project" PEL Allegedly Conceived Has Not Been Built, is Economically Infeasible, and is Not Being Built
B. PEL Did Not "Conceive" the Unbuilt Project Whose Illusory Profits It Seeks
C. PEL Lacked, in Any Event, the Necessary Expertise to Execute the Project
D. The MOI Did Not Promise or Provide PEL Enforceable Concession Rights
1. Mozambique's Interpretation of the MOI is Consistent with, and Dictated By, the Plain Language of the MOI and Applicable Mozambican PPP Laws
2. It is PEL's Interpretation of the MOI That "Puts a Square Peg Into a Round Hole" and Is Foreclosed By Mozambican Law and Industry Practice
3. The Parties' Conduct Does Not Support PEL's Unusual Interpretation of the MOI
4. PEL Does Not Specify What "Documents Identified During the Document Production Phase" Confirm its Anomalous Interpretation of the MOI
5. The Parties Did Not (and Could Not) Intend "To Grant PEL a Right to the Concession" on The Basis of a MOI and PFS
6. The Parties Did Not (and Could Not) Intend to Automatically Award the Project to PEL Subject Only to "a Right to Refuse."
7. PEL's Alleged Exclusivity Right was Consistent with an Unsolicited Proposal with a Scoring Advantage, Existed Only for the Duration of PFS Review, and Was Not Violated
8. The Portuguese-Language MOI Must Prevail Under Mozambican Law and Industry Practice
E. PEL Never Disclosed its Blacklisting to Mozambique
F. PEL's Prefeasibility Study was Inadequate for Awarding a Concession, But was Approved for the Purpose of Providing PEL a Direito de Preferência To Be Materialized In a Tender
G. PEL Failed to Reach an Agreement with CFM, Making Any Investigation of a Direct Award Futile. PEL Also Wrongfully Maintained that CFM Must Be Limited to 20% Equity Participation
H. PEL's New Allegations That Mozambique "Was Planning to Oust PEL of its Own Project and to Appropriate its Know-How" are Internally Inconsistent and Preposterous
I. PEL Acknowledged the Applicability of the PPP Law and Standard Public Tender Regime, Sought a Discretionary, Last Resort Exclusion, and Requested an Extraordinary Direct Award Without Satisfying Admitted Prerequisites
J. The MTC Accommodated PEL by Giving PEL a 15% Direito de Preferência in the Necessary and Prudent Public Tender
K. The MTC Conducted a Tender Process, and PEL Participated Through a Consortium, Waiving any Rights Under the MOI
L. The MTC Properly Scored the Public Tender, the Winner was ITD, and the PGS Consortium Failed to Submit a Timely Appeal
1. PEL Does Not Demonstrate that Mozambique Used Alleged PEL "Know-How" To Develop The Tender--Yet It Would Fine If It Did
2. The Tender Notice and Tender Documents Were Not Deficient-- They Garnered Substantial Industry Interest and PEL Did Not Complain or Request Clarification Contemporaneously
3. PEL Has No Standing to Complain About When Other Bidders Were Told of PEL's MOI-Derived Direito De Preferência
4. Mozambique Properly Evaluated the Proposals
5. The PGS Consortium Admittedly Did Not Pursue an Appeal
6. PEL Misleads the Tribunal in Asserting That Mozambique Did Not Produce Tender Documents or Documents Related to the ITD Concession--Because the Tribunal Did Not Order Their Production
M. The Project as Proposed by PEL Would Not Have Been Viable. The TML Project Differs Substantially from PEL's Proposal
N. PEL Violated the Confidentiality Clause in the MOI, and Made False & Defamatory Public Statements About Mozambique
O. Mozambique is Properly Resolving the Parties' Dispute Arising Out of the MOI Before the Jurisdictionally-Unquestioned ICC Tribunal, and PEL's Bombast Has Been Rejected Time and Again
P. If Any Adverse Inferences Are to be Made on the Basis of the Parties' Productions, They Should be Made Against PEL
Q. The Dispute Over the Authenticity of the English-Language MOIs is Sensibly Addressed by Relying Upon the Controlling Portuguese MOI

III. PEL'S CLAIMS ARE INADMISSIBLE, BECAUSE PEL FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO OR CONCEALED FROM MOZAMBIQUE AND THE MTC: (1) PEL'S BLACKLISTING BY THE NHAI IN INDIA, AND (2) THE JUDGMENTS OF THE DELHI HIGH COURT AND INDIA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDING PEL'S BLACKLISTING AND HOLDING PEL IS "NOT COMMERCIALLY RELIABLE AND TRUSTWORTHY."

A. The Record Establishes that PEL was Blacklisted in India, and the Delhi High Court and India Supreme Court Issued Judgments Upholding the Blacklisting and Ruling that PEL is "Not Commercially Reliable and Trustworthy."
1. PEL Was Blacklisted In India. The Delhi High Court and India Supreme Court Upheld PEL's Blacklisting, and Held That PEL Is "Not Commercially Reliable and Trustworthy."
2. PEL's Distinction That It was "Debarred," and Not "Blacklisted," is Inconsequential Because the Terms are Used Interchangeably, and the India Supreme Court Indicated That PEL was "Blacklisted."
3. PEL Has Misrepresented to This Tribunal That the NHAI Blacklisting Did Not Affect PEL's Ability to Enter into Contracts with Other Public Authorities. A Jharkhand State Authority Rejected PEL as A Bidder Based on the Prior/Expired NHAI Blacklisting and the Jharkhand High Court Upheld the Authority's Exclusion of PEL
B. The "Admissibility" Analysis May Be Guided by International Law Principles, Including Whether the Investor Violated the Principle of Good Faith, Acted Fraudulently, Violated Public Policy and/or Would be Unjustly Enriched
C. The Relevant Time Period for the Admissibility Analysis Should Focus on the Making of the Investment and Maintain Flexibility to Consider the Spectrum of the Investor's Conduct
D. PEL's Concealment of Its Blacklisting and the Judgments of the Delhi High Court and India Supreme Court Fall Squarely Within The Time Period When the NHAI Blacklisting Was in Force and PEL Made its Alleged Investment
1. According to PEL's Own Allegations, the Time Period Involving PEL's "Making" of its "Investment" Extends from the Beginning of April, 2011 Through, at A Minimum, 15 June 2012
2. According to PEL's Legal Expert, the Time Period Involving PEL's "Making" of its "Investment" Extends Further to 16 April 2013
3. The Time Period of The NHAI's Notification of PEL, The Length of PEL's Blacklisting, and Issuances of the Delhi High Court and India Supreme Court Judgments, Comprises 20 May 2011 to 19 May 2012
4. There is No Temporal Impediment to Admissibility Because The Time Periods of The NHAI Blacklisting of PEL and The Issuances of the India Judgments Overlap PEL's Making of its Alleged Investment
E. It Is Undisputed that PEL Did Not Disclose to The MTC or Mozambique: (1) the NHAI's Blacklisting of PEL, (2) the Resulting Judgment of the Delhi High Court, and (3) the Resulting Judgment of the India Supreme Court
F. The NHAI's Blacklisting of PEL, The Judgment of the Delhi High Court, and The Judgment of the India Supreme Court Were Relevant and Material to The MTC's Decision of Whether PEL Could be Relied Upon and Trusted as a PPP Partner on The Subject Public Infrastructure Project in Mozambique
G. PEL Had A Duty to Disclose PEL's Blacklisting by The NHAI, and The Indian Judgments to Mozambique Because Under The International Principle of Good Faith, The Investor has an Obligation to Provide The Host State with Relevant and Material Information Concerning The Investor
H. Under Mozambican Law and the Public Tender Documents for this Project, PEL Also had A Duty to Disclose NHAI's Blacklisting and The Indian Judgments to Mozambique
I. PEL Also had A Duty to Disclose PEL's Blacklisting by The NHAI, and The Indian Judgments to Mozambique, Under International PPP Best Practices
J. First, Mozambique Has Established That PEL's Claims are Inadmissible Because, at A Minimum, PEL Violated the Principle of Good Faith by Failing to Disclose or Concealing, from The MTC and Mozambique, PEL's Blacklisting by the NHAI, and the Judgments of the Delhi High Court and India Supreme Court Upholding PEL's Blacklisting and Holding PEL Is "Not (Commercially) Reliable and Trustworthy," While PEL Was Seeking to Obtain a Direct Award Representing that it "Deserves the Trust of a Direct Award."
K. Second, Mozambique Has Established That PEL's Claims are Inadmissible Because PEL Engaged in Fraudulent Concealment by Failing to Disclose
L. Third, Mozambique Has Established That PEL's Claims are Inadmissible Because PEL Would Be Unjustly Enriched
M. Fourth, Mozambique Has Established That PEL's Claims are Inadmissible Because PEL Violated the Tender Documents and Mozambican Law by Failing to Disclose
N. Fifth, Mozambique Has Also Established That PEL's Claims are Inadmissible Because PEL Violated International Public Policy, by Failing to Disclose

IV. PEL'S CLAIMS ARE INADMISSIBLE BASED ON ITS ATTEMPTED BRIBERY OF THE MTC MINISTER, AND VIOLATIONS OF THE MOI'S ANTI-CORRUPTION CLAUSE, THE BIDDING DOCUMENTS' ANTI- CORRUPTION PROVISIONS, AND MOZAMBICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW

V. PEL'S REPEATED ACCUSATION THAT THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE IS ENGAGING IN "GUERILLA TACTICS" IS PERJORATVE AND INSULTING TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF MOZAMBIQUE, AND IS FURTHER GROUNDS TO FIND PEL'S CLAIMS INDAMISSIBLE

VI. THIS TRIBUNAL LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PEL'S TREATY CLAIMS. THIS DISPUTE DOES NOT ARISE FROM AN INVESTMENT BECAUSE (1) THE MOI AND ATTENDANT RIGHTS ARE NOT AN "INVESTMENT" BUT A MERE OPTION, (2) THERE WAS NO EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER, (3) PEL IS NOT AN INVESTOR, (4) ASSIGNED ITS RIGHTS AND FAILED TO EXHAUST LOCAL REMEDIES, AND (5) THE BIT HAS BEEN TERMINATED

A. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae) Because The MOI and PEL's Related Activities and Expenditures Are Not an "Investment" under International Law. At Most, The MOI, Arguendo, Provided PEL Contingent Rights (A Right of Preference) or an Option, Which Are Not an "Investment."
B. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae) Because There was No Exercise of Sovereign Power by Mozambique. As A Result, This Is Purely A Contractual Dispute
C. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae) Because The MOI Is Not an "Investment" Under the BIT
D. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae) Because The MOI and PEL's Related Activities Are Also Not an Investment Applying the Traditional Salini Factors
E. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Personae) Because PEL is Not an Investor
F. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Personae) Because the Real Party in Interest is The PGS Consortium; PEL Cannot Bring these Claims Alone, and the PGS Consortium Cannot Be Joined in this Proceeding
G. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae/Ratione Temporis) Based on PEL's Violation of International Law Principles and Mozambican Law
H. The Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Temporis) Because the BIT was Terminated and The Sunset Clause Does Not Apply
I. The Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Temporis) Because Laches Bars PEL's Belated Pursuit of this Treaty Arbitration

VII. THIS TRIBUNAL LACKS JURISDICTION, OR SHOULD DECLINE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION, OVER THE PARTIES' CONTRACTUAL DISPUTE PURSUANT TO THE PARTIES' ICC ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

A. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae) Because The Parties' ICC Arbitration Agreement Governs Resolution of The Parties' Underlying Contractual Dispute
1. Mozambique Has Commenced A Pending ICC Arbitration Pursuant to The MOI's Arbitration Agreement to Resolve The Parties' Underlying Contractual Dispute
2. The ICC Tribunal Has Already Concluded It Has Jurisdiction Over The Parties' Local Law Contractual Dispute Pursuant to The MOI's ICC Arbitration Agreement
3. The ICC Tribunal Rejected PEL's Stay Application and Is Deciding The Prerequisite Contract and Property Issues That Form The Underlying Basis of PEL's Treaty Claims in This Proceeding
4. The ICC Tribunal Has Jurisdiction to Adjudicate The Parties' Underlying Contractual Dispute. This UNCITRAL Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction or, in The Alternative, Should Abstain from Doing So, and Yield to The ICC Tribunal at Least on This Issue
B. This Tribunal Lacks Jurisdiction (Ratione Materiae) Because the Parties' ICC Arbitration Agreement Also Governs the International Law Treaty Dispute

VIII. MOZAMBIQUE ENGAGED IN NO WRONGFUL CONDUCT AND DID NOT BREACH THE TREATY

A. PEL Fundamentally has no Underlying Rights to a Concession that are Protected by the Treaty
B. Mozambique Did Not Breach the Treaty's Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
1. PEL Does Not Meaningfully Contest Mozambique's Articulation of the Applicable Legal Standards, and Cannot Distinguish Cases Finding That Preliminary Agreements Like the MOI Are Non- Binding
2. Mozambique Did Not "Renege[] on the Specific Assurances Contained In the MOI" Because the MOI Did Not Promise What PEL Alleges
3. Mozambique Acted Consistently and Transparently
4. Mozambique Did Not Breach Any Obligation to Refrain from Acting in an Arbitrary Manner
5. Mozambique Acted in Good Faith
C. Mozambique Did Not Indirectly Expropriate Anything, Because PEL Had No Enforceable Concession Rights
1. PEL Does Not Meaningfully Contest Mozambique's Articulation of The Applicable Legal Standards
2. PEL Cannot Demonstrate That Anything Was Expropriated
D. Mozambique Did Not Breach Any Allegedly Incorporated Umbrella Clause Because It Never Breached the MOI
1. The Parties Dispute Whether Importation of an Umbrella Clause is Appropriate in This Instance, And Whether the ICC Arbitration Clause in the Subject Contract Should Be Respected. Nonetheless, PEL Does Not Meaningfully Contest Mozambique's Articulation of Legal Standards Applicable to an Umbrella Clause Breach Analysis: Domestic Law Governs
2. PEL Cannot Establish That It Had Its Claimed Rights or That The MOI Was Breached
E. In Sum, Mozambique Prevails on the Merits

IX. THE FLAWS IN PEL'S DAMAGES CLAIMS REMAIN AND HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED; PEL IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY DAMAGES

A. Summary of The Flaws in PEL's Damages Claims
B. PEL's New Damages Claims Are in Violation of Procedural Order No. 1
C. Damages May Not Be Awarded for An Illegal or Fraudulently Obtained Alleged Right
1. Damages for The Alleged Right to the Direct Negotiation of a Concession Are Zero - Such an Alleged Right Would be Illegal Under Mozambique Law
2. Damages Cannot Be Awarded for An Alleged Right Procured By Fraud
D. PEL Is Not Owed Damages Based Upon the Value of The Alleged Right in The MOI To Direct Negotiation of A Concession
1. PEL Is Not Entitled to Alleged Future Profit-Based Damages for A Concession Never Awarded and That Never Happened
2. So-Called "Individual Circumstances" Do Not Warrant Application of Versant's DCF Analyses
E. PEL's Misapplication of "Loss of Opportunity" Case Law Does Not Save PEL's Damages Claim
1. Damages Based Upon Impermissible, Speculative Inputs are Still Speculative
2. Case Law Does Not Support The Methodology PEL Uses to Claim "Loss of Opportunity" Damages
3. PEL's Ipse Dixit 90% Probability Has No Basis In Fact
F. The TML Project Is Not A Valid Basis for PEL's Claimed Damages, But Certainly Cannot at Once Be Both Comparable and Ignored
1. PEL Has Not Reasonably Responded to The Material Differences of The TML Project
2. Substantial Differences Between PEL, on The One Hand, And TML, on The Other, Compel The Conclusion That PEL Could Not Have Undertaken The TML Project
G. Versant's Several DCF Analyses Remain Fundamentally Flawed
1. The Speculative and Unsupported Flaws of PEL's Damages Claims Are Not Improved Simply by PEL Engaging in More Speculation
2. Versant's New Ex Post DCF Analysis Remains Fundamentally Flawed
H. PEL Has Failed or Refused to Provide Any Record Evidence Of The Amount Of Any Direct Damage
I. PEL Is Not Entitled to Interest
1. PEL Has Not Demonstrated Entitlement to Interest
2. Even As to Its Alleged Ex Ante Damages, PEL's Interest Claims Are Improper
J. Conclusions As to PEL's Damages Claims

X. MOZAMBIQUE SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AGAINST PEL AND ITS LITIGATION FUNDER

XI. RELIEF SOUGHT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Respondent Republic of Mozambique ("Mozambique") submits its Rejoinder on the Merits and Reply to Objections to Jurisdiction ("Rejoinder"). Mozambique's Rejoinder addresses the contentions Claimant Patel Engineering Ltd. ("PEL") made in its Reply on the Merits and Response to Objections to Jurisdiction ("Reply").

2. The facts and equities soundly favor Mozambique. As a pragmatic threshold matter, this is a dispute over alleged pre-concession rights to a coal-export project concept that could not be financed in the decade since the "Memorandum of Interest" ("MOI") and lacks any positive market value. The subject "Project" has never been built, and is not being built because it is not economically feasible. PEL and its litigation financiers seek a massive windfall even though PEL did not "conceive" of any project, cannot quantify any investment expense, and lacked the necessary experience to finance and execute this proposed rail and port public-private partnership ("PPP") project. Yet, setting all that aside, PEL's claim suffers from an equally fundamental flaw: the MOI did not (and could not) provide PEL enforceable concession rights. Mozambique offers the only interpretation of the six-page MOI that harmonizes its plain language, Mozambican PPP and procurement laws, and PPP industry practices. PEL's six-page MOI did nothing more than provide PEL a conditional direito de preferência subject to Mozambican law during the continued process of procurement. Mozambican law expressly defined that direito de preferência, consistent with international PPP best practices, as a 15% direito de preferência in the public tender required for projects of this type. Likewise, as common in the PPP industry, any exclusivity or confidentiality rights for the proponent of the unsolicited PPP proposal are limited to the term of the prefeasibility study preparation and approval (as specified in the MOI) and do not preclude a competitive tender. Tenders are the expected norm; direct awards are a disfavored "last resort" requiring approvals MTC could not provide. The parties' conduct both before and after the MOI's execution supports Mozambique's reasoned understanding, and there were no significant "volte faces." This much is clear: a $3 billion concession of this type cannot be promised or awarded on the basis of a mere MOI and a modest Pre-Feasibility Study that fails to even specify PEL's bid price (much less the numerous other items and approvals necessary for a concession award of this type). Internationally, the common, expected, and appropriate practice for unsolicited PPP proposals is to do precisely what MTC did: provide the proposer a preferential scoring right in the public tender. Rather than contemporaneously litigating any anomalous alleged right to a direct award through available dispute resolution mechanisms, PEL chose to participate in the tender process, as part of the PGS Consortium, and recognized in doing so that the Ministry of Transport and Communications ("MTC") had no obligation to award it the project. MTC ran the tender appropriately, the PGS Consortium scored in third place after consideration of its direito de preferência, and no one appealed. PEL's claim would be frivolous if not demanding a shocking $156 million from Mozambique.

3. However, this Tribunal should not even reach the merits. PEL's claims are inadmissible.

Under international law, Mozambican law, PPP best practices, and the subject tender documents, PEL was obligated to disclose material information concerning PEL. PEL's claims are inadmissible because PEL concealed the NHAI's (India's transportation agency) blacklisting of PEL, in a project of national importance, and the Judgments of the Delhi High Court and India Supreme Court upholding PEL's blacklisting and holding PEL is "not commercially reliable and trustworthy," while PEL represented to the MTC that PEL "deserves the trust of a direct award." The periods when PEL's blacklisting remained in force and the Judgments were issued overlap PEL's "making" of its alleged "investment."

The Indian courts held PEL reneged on its winning bid after learning another bidder had offered a lower price, PEL "withdrew at the last minute" and acted in an "unbusinessman like" manner, this was "the first case" in India when a winning bidder had reneged, and PEL "had no qualms in ditching the project at the nth hour," causing damages to the NHAI.

These facts were material to the MTC's decision whether PEL was a suitable PPP partner that could be relied upon and trusted with a 30-year public transportation infrastructure project to construct a USD $3 billion port and 500km railway in Mozambique. If PEL had disclosed these facts, the MTC would have ceased further dealings with PEL, even after the MOI was signed. Based on PEL's violation of the international law principles of good faith and transparency, and its fraudulently concealments, PEL's claims are inadmissible.

4. The Tribunal also lacks jurisdiction over PEL's claims. Investment treaty precedents have unanimously concluded that contingent rights are not an "investment." The MOI and its attendant rights were contingent on the occurrence of specified conditions. Only after these conditions were satisfied, did the MOI provide PEL with an alleged right in the nature of an option (that is, a right of preference/direito de preferência or, arguendo, right of first refusal). But that alleged right alone, even if PEL had exercised its option, does not rise to the level of an investment. Instead, an executed "PPP concession agreement" is critical to the existence of an "investment," when the contemplated investment is a PPP concession.

However, a PPP concession agreement was never executed by PEL and the MTC.

Similarly, PEL's pre-investment activities and expenditures, which did not ultimately come to fruition, are not a covered "investment." This is also confirmed by the BIT, which specifically requires that, in order to constitute an "investment," "business concessions" must have been "established or acquired." There also can be no "investment" because there was no exercise of sovereign power by Mozambique, which acted as a commercial actor. The MOI presented only a commercial risk, was a preliminary document, and the parties' dealings do not satisfy the Salini factors. This leaves PEL with a contract claim under the MOI. This dispute is governed by the ICC arbitration agreement in the MOI, which is valid, severable and enforceable, and broad enough to cover both the underlying contract dispute, as well as the treaty dispute. At a minimum, this Tribunal must wait for the ICC tribunal to adjudicate the underlying contract dispute per the ICC arbitration clause, or risk rendering an award that will be vacated under the New York Convention.

Without the alleged contract rights, there can be no treaty claims. The parties specifically referred the contract dispute to the ICC, overriding the treaty dispute resolution provisions.

5. PEL has not established any breach of the Treaty. PEL never had the rights it now alleges.

Its alleged expectations were neither legitimate nor reasonable in light of the facts, the law applicable to the procurement, and PPP practices locally and internationally. The complained-of actions were all commercial in nature (not an exercise of sovereign power), and in any event PEL received fair and substantial value for a mere MOI and PFS: a 15% direito de preferência in the public tender. Mozambique never breached the FET standard; PEL held no definitive concession rights to expropriate; and PEL cannot articulate an umbrella clause breach.

6. Regarding damages, PEL is not entitled to damages for several reasons. Because Mozambique is not liable for the wrongs alleged by PEL, there can be no award of damages. Even as to any alleged damages themselves, PEL is not entitled to the amounts it seeks. PEL's damages analyses deliberately ignore that its own May 2012 projections demonstrated that the project it proposed was financially non-viable--and that therefore its damages are zero. PEL's DCF-based future profits analyses are both impermissibly speculative under well-settled precedent, and severely flawed. Indeed, the wild swings in valuations based upon PEL's own assumptions and methodologies only serve to demonstrate how unreliable PEL's damages claims are. PEL's so-called "loss of opportunity" alterative does not present a valid alternative damages claim, but rather simply adds more inaccurate speculation on its already speculative DCF analyses. Finally, PEL fails or refuses to even attempt to support a claim for cost-based damages, meaning that (even if damages were otherwise appropriate, and they are not) PEL has not even attempted to provide the Tribunal with a valid, non-speculative basis for any claimed damages. PEL's damages claims should be rejected in their entirety.

...

XI. RELIEF SOUGHT

1601. Based on the foregoing, Mozambique is entitled to and seeks an Award, as follows:

1601.1. Dismissing PEL's claims as inadmissible or, alternatively, declining jurisdiction;

1601.2. Sustaining Mozambique's objections to jurisdiction;

1601.3. In the alternative, dismissing PEL's case on the merits;

1601.4. Awarding PEL no damages;

1601.5. Ordering that PEL and its litigation funder pay Mozambique's attorneys' fees and all costs and expenses; and

1601.6. Granting Respondent such further or other relief as the Tribunal shall deem to be just and appropriate.

Dated: 29 November 2021.

Respectfully submitted.

Counsel for Respondent
Republic of Mozambique