An Elusive Safeguard With Loopholes: Sovereign Debt and its "Negotiated Restructuring" in International Investment Agreements in the Age of Global Financial Crisis

K. Nakajima
Nakajima, Kei

Article from: TDM 1 (2018), in Investor-State Disputes - International Investment Law

Abstract

Financial crises often compel indebted countries to restructure their external public debt in order to ease their economic burden. Since this is usually quite disadvantageous to the creditors, they consequently sometimes begin "holdout" litigation so as to obtain the face value of their original bonds with interest. In this context, investor-state arbitration has been seen as an attractive alternative to litigation for creditors because the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is far more effective than those of foreign judgments. Yet such a holdout strategy would undermine an ...

To read this article you need to be a subscriber

Sign in

Forgot password?

Sign in

Subscribe

Fill in the registration form and answer a few simple questions to receive a quote.

Subscribe now

Why subscribe?

TDM journal

Access to TDM Journal articles (well over 2500 articles in total for Premium account holders)

Legal & regulatory

Access to Legal & Regulatory data (well over 10000 documents)

OGEMID

OGEMID membership (lively discussion platform bringing together the world's international dispute management community)

Suggested Citation

K. Nakajima; "An Elusive Safeguard With Loopholes: Sovereign Debt and its "Negotiated Restructuring" in International Investment Agreements in the Age of Global Financial Crisis"
TDM 1 (2018), www.transnational-dispute-management.com

URL: www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2532