Remedies to Default on International Lending: Any Improvement From Bilateral Investment Treaties?

M. Barra
Barra, Matteo

Article from: TDM 1 (2005), in Investor-State Disputes - International Investment Law

Summary

The research question in this paper concerns the default by sovereign borrowers on international lending. Plan of the work is to shortly review in an historical perspective the financial cycles of international debt, emphasizing the current trend giving relevance to the bonds markets. It will be pointed out that the main legal issue affecting international debt is default. In particular, default of debt obligations by sovereign borrowers implies sovereign risk deriving from: sovereign law-making, sovereign immunity, and state insolvency (Ch. 2). Preliminarily it would be useful ...

To read this article you need to be a subscriber

Sign in

Forgot password?

Sign in

Subscribe

Fill in the registration form and answer a few simple questions to receive a quote.

Subscribe now

Why subscribe?

TDM journal

Access to TDM Journal articles (well over 2500 articles in total for Premium account holders)

Legal & regulatory

Access to Legal & Regulatory data (well over 10000 documents)

OGEMID

OGEMID membership (lively discussion platform bringing together the world's international dispute management community)

Suggested Citation

M. Barra; "Remedies to Default on International Lending: Any Improvement From Bilateral Investment Treaties?"
TDM 1 (2005), www.transnational-dispute-management.com

URL: www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=363