Abstract

This article provides a critical analysis of economic countermeasures within the framework of international law, focusing on their application by third-party states that are not directly harmed by wrongful acts. It differentiates economic countermeasures from sanctions, underlining the former's basis in the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. To be lawful, these countermeasures must be proportional, necessary, and temporary.

The author scrutinizes both the legal ambiguity and real-world effectiveness of third-party measures, using the example of U.S. sanctions on Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Although these actions damaged Yugoslavia's economy, they fell short of securing full compliance without additional military and diplomatic pressure.

The author also raises ethical concerns about civilian suffering and questions the legal soundness of such unilateral measures. She concludes that independent countermeasures often result in selective application, legal inconsistency, and the risk of regional instability and advocates for more precisely targeted and collectively endorsed responses, backed by a stronger legal framework. While economic countermeasures remain a vital tool in enforcing international obligations, their impact is constrained by complex legal, ethical, and geopolitical challenges. The article shows that a more coordinated, lawful, and strategic application is essential to improve their effectiveness and uphold the rule of law.

This paper will be part of the third TDM Special Issue on "Sanctions and International Arbitration: Impact on Substantive and Procedural Issues". More information here www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=1960