Abstract

Following the presentation of the legislative framework of EU sanctions due to Russia’s aggression and the full range of the imposed sanctions, this paper focuses on the sanctioned oil and gas sector of Russia. It takes the view that the oil and gas sanctions against Russia are not as sweeping as they are presented. In truth, they are riddled with exceptions, repeated grace periods and privileged treatment of specific projects that question the sanctions’ effectiveness. Such an example is the exception adopted for the Sakhalin-2 project. The EU offers no satisfactory explanation for derogating from the prohibitions itself has set. The stated aims are meagre and occasionally absent, whereas the preparatory documents unavailable. Legal remedies are non-existent. It thus seems that the specific legislative powers of the EU, although sweeping in nature, have been deprived of both checks and balances. The Commission and the Council of the EU that set the rules are powerful institutions; nonetheless they are still bound by the Treaties, the general principles of the EU law, the international law on international organizations and public international law. This is what the rule of law mandates.

This paper will be part of the third TDM Special Issue on "Sanctions and International Arbitration: Impact on Substantive and Procedural Issues". More information here www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=1960