Summary

Respondent's last-minute and unfounded suggestion of mootness creates no basis to depart from the proper path forward in this case: a GVR in light of Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, 146 S. Ct. 1209 (2026).

The question presented to this Court is whether the Third Circuit erred in holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioners' motions to stay (FAA Section 3) and to compel arbitration (FAA Section 4). As Jules teaches, the district court's undisputed jurisdiction over respondent's Section 1782 application gave the court subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioners' FAA motions as well.

With the benefit of Jules, the panel majority likely would not have mistakenly held to the contrary. The arbitral award does not bear on this question. It did not address subject-matter jurisdiction and thus does not change the appropriateness of a GVR.

Nor is this Court the proper forum for respondent's late-breaking suggestion of mootness. No lower court has ever passed on that issue, and this Court is a court of review, not first view. Courts, including this one, routinely defer mootness claims to the merits, after subject-matter jurisdiction is determined. Once the Third Circuit reconsiders subject-matter jurisdiction in light of Jules, it can address respondent's mootness claim. This Court need not decide it at this stage.

At any rate, this arbitral award clearly does not moot this case. Mootness occurs when a court is incapable of granting the prevailing party relief.

Here, nothing in the arbitral award prevents the courts from granting the relief that petitioners sought in their motion in the district court: that respondent's Section 1782 application be referred to arbitration (and the Section 1782 proceeding be otherwise stayed).

Respondent's supplemental brief actually raises a merits argument: that the arbitral tribunal "agreed with the core premise that Section 1782 applications are simply not the type of proceeding contemplated by arbitration." Resp. Supp. Br. 3. That is the issue that the lower court should address after a GVR; it does not warrant allowing the Third Circuit's erroneous subject-matter jurisdiction ruling to stand.

To be clear, respondent's brief misleadingly disguises the broader context of the tribunal's discussion: a breach-of-contract claim brought by BGF (but not the other petitioners) seeking damages for respondent's filing in the U.S. courts in the first place. While the tribunal declined to find liability in that specific instance, it decisively found for BGF on almost all its other claims. Moreover, the arbitral award is not binding on the district court--or on the other two petitioners that were not parties. In all events, the impact of the arbitral award is a matter for the courts below after remand.